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DIT SCORES AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY:
EVIDENCE OF A NON-SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP

ABSTRACT
The present study was motivated by concern about the validity of the DIT and
methodological issues in Fisher and Sweeney (2001, 1998) studies. Our study of 98 accounting
students from three private institutions in the eastern U.S. generates results that directly
contradict those of Fisher and Sweeney’s (1998). Using the nine-point scale, we could reject our
three hypotheses relating to DIT scores associating with political orientation. First, we find that
there was not a significant difference between the pre-test DIT scores of liberal and conservative
politically orientated students. Second, the follow on DIT test scores for those students who were
not politically conservative did not decrease when responding from a conservative perspective.
Third, the follow on DIT test scores for those students who were not politically liberal did not
increase when responding from a liberal perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past 10 years, ethics research in accounting using the DIT has dramatically
increased. This increase is not only due to an increased emphasis on ethics as an important
consideration in accounting research, but it is also due to an increase in the new graduates of
doctoral programs (Ponemon, 1988; Bernardi, 1991; Massey, 1997; Thorne, 1997) who felt the
need to challenge the existing ethical beliefs of accounting. A common thread in their research
interests is the use of Rest’s Defining Issues Test (1979). Ponemon examined the average level
of moral development by staff level in public accounting. Bernardi found that high-moral
development managers detected fraud at a significantly higher rate when they were provided
with information concerning client integrity ratings. Massey and Thorne developed tests of
moral reasoning based on the Defining Issues Tests that used auditing based dilemmas.
Fisher and Sweeney (2001, p. 3) question the continued use of the Defining Issues Test
DIT because research to date provides only “relatively modest relationships found between
moral reasoning of accountants . . . and professional judgments and behavior”. Perhaps a more
cogent argument would be that the DIT uses generic dilemmas and that the use of auditingbased-dilemmas (Massey, 1997; Thorne, 1997) might provide clearer results.

Fisher and

Sweeney’s argument continues that scores on the DIT “favor those with political liberalism to
political Conservatism” (p. 3).

Similar arguments were voiced by Gilligan (1988) who

maintained that the DIT was favored (opposed) the male (female) justice (care) oriented
reasoning. Bernardi and Arnold (1997) found that, rather than scoring lower than men, women
actually scored significantly higher than men on the DIT.

Bernardi and Arnold note that

Gilligan’s results may have resulted from sampling bias since her sample only consisted of 32
subjects divided into eight groups of four (two men and two women). Our research examines the
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same hypotheses as Fisher and Sweeney (1998) to determine whether their findings might be the
result of faulty assumptions about sample distribution.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Moral Development
We can partially describe the theory of moral development through its four
characteristics: cognitive, structural, developmental and sequential. First, moral development
theory maintains that cognition is an integral part of the ethical decision process. Second,
cognitive structures frame the six levels of moral reasoning. Third, moral development is a
cognitive process that develops over time. Fourth, the developmental process is sequential
because moral reasoning progresses in one direction only (Ponemon & Gabhart, 1993).
While an individual may progress to higher levels of moral reasoning structures over
time, they cannot regress. Rest and Narváez (1994) describe this developmental process using a
staircase as an example. Increases in moral reasoning are likened to an individual climbing a
staircase; development (climbing the staircase) occurs in discrete steps. According to this
developmental perspective, how morality is perceived is a function of an individual’s level of
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1958, 1979). The three levels of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning are:
pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional or principled (Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
Although in the early course of his research, Kohlberg (1958, 1969) noted an apparent
retrogression in some subjects’ moral development, upon closer examination, Kohlberg (1973,
1976) later realized that these seemingly retrogressive responses were the result of subjects’
“transitioning” from lower to higher levels of moral reasoning. That is, transitioning from lower
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to higher levels of moral reasoning can be likened to a child’s transitioning from crawling to
walking. During a child’s transitioning, s/he might at one time walk to a desired destination but
later, because it is a more effortless method of self-propulsion, get to that same destination by
crawling. Similarly, during the moral reasoning transitioning process, although people may focus
on higher-stage moral considerations, for ease of consideration, they may later focus on moral
considerations from the previous stage in Kohlberg’s model. Thus, the levels in Kohlberg’s
model are sequential; people move from one to the next and do not revert to previous levels once
they have mastered the next level.

Stability of DIT Scores
McGeorge (1975) finds that the DIT is immune to artificial score inflation. In an
experiment, he had three groups of subjects complete the DIT twice. In a fully randomized
design, each of the groups completed the DIT once with ordinary instructions. In one group
(Control Group), the other completion of the DIT was also according to the original instructions.
In the second group (Experimental Group), McGeorge asked subjects to “fake good” on their
other completion of the DIT. In the third group (Experimental group), McGeorge asked subjects
to “fake bad” on their other completion of the DIT. Importantly, although McGeorge found no
significant differences in DIT scores for any other condition, he found subjects’ DIT scores were
significantly different in the “fake bad” conditions (whether they were in the ordinary-bad or
bad-ordinary group).
Thus, while subjects could lower their scores on the DIT in response to instructions to
“fake bad,” they could not artificially inflate them. These results reinforce the notion that moral
reasoning is a cognitive skill. That is, while subjects can understand and therefore utilize moral
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reasoning below their level of moral development, because they do not comprehend moral
reasoning considerations above their level of moral development, they cannot utilize moral
reasoning above their level of moral development.

Political Ideology and the DIT – Current Debate
The DIT is grounded in Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive theory of moral development. It
appears often in psychology and social science studies (Rest, 1986; 1999). It is very popular
with accounting researchers as a measure of moral judgment in ethics based research. In general
ethics researchers find that the moral judgment of accounting students and public accountants is
less advanced than that of individuals at similar educational levels.
Some researchers question the validity the DIT and believe that the DIT produces a
biased measure of moral reasoning ability. Emler et al. (1983) assert that the DIT score is a
measure of political attitude. Fisher and Sweeney (1998, 2001) argue and present evidence that
the DIT confounds political ideology with moral reasoning development. If this is so, the results
for much of the ethics based research in accounting are questionable and this body of research
becomes extremely difficult to assess and interpret.
A primary assumption of moral development theory is that an individual at a given stage
of moral development is incapable of understanding higher order moral arguments. This gives
rise to the basic tenet that DIT scores can be “faked downward” but not “faked upward”. In
essence an individual can lower his/her score on the DIT by identifying lower order responses
but should not be able to identify higher order responses as they are beyond the cognitive
capacity of the individual.
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Fisher and Sweeney (1998, 2001) argue that the DIT has an underlying political content
that over (under) states an individual’s true capacity for moral reasoning. This may cause an
individual to consciously or unconsciously reject more advanced responses even though the
individual understands the underlying moral reasoning. Their basic arguments are as follows:

“But if a politically conservative person comprehends the cognitive complexity of
principled DIT responses and chooses to avoid ranking those responses as
important because he or she associates this viewpoint with liberalism, then the P
score would not be measuring this person’s most advanced moral thinking. .
.Similarly, a politically liberal test-taker may overstate his or her DIT P score by
ranking higher-order response items as important because of their association
with liberal ideology, without comprehending the underlying moral content
(Fisher and Sweeney, 2001, p. 7).”

Fisher and Sweeney Studies
In their 1998 study, Fisher and Sweeney had 112 undergraduate student accounting
majors as experimental subjects. Subjects first responded to the three-story version of the DIT, a
National Election Survey, and also indicated on a seven-point scale how liberal or conservative
they were concerning important political and social issues. After a two-week period the subjects
were instructed to complete the DIT from either the perspective of an “extremely conservative”
or “extremely liberal” person, which was done on a random basis.

As discussed in the

introduction of this paper, we question the methodology of Fisher and Sweeney for this
experiment. In that study subjects decreased their P scores by responding to the DIT from an
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“extremely conservative” perspective and increased their P scores by responding to the DIT from
and “extremely liberal’ perspective. As a result, they suggest that some items in the DIT may
have a political content separate from their contribution to the assessment of moral judgment.
In their 2001 study, Fisher and Sweeney had 221 undergraduate student accounting
majors from two Midwestern universities as experimental subjects. A between-subject-design
was utilized and subjects were randomly assigned to either the control or experimental condition.
Both groups completed the six-dilemma DIT. The control group completed the DIT under
standard test instructions. In the experimental group, subjects received modified instructions
informing them that:

The Defining issues Test is a standardized measure of moral judgment. We are
interested in whether you can identify the statements designed to represent the
highest level of moral judgment.

Subjects indicated on a seven-point scale how liberal or conservative they were concerning
important political and social issues and this served as the basis for classifying subjects as liberal,
moderate or conservative. Again, as indicated in the introduction, we question this methodology.
The experimental results show that, for conservatives, the mean DIT P score was
significantly higher (p < .05) under the modified instructions than under the standard
instructions.

As a result, they suggest that the DIT systematically understates the moral

reasoning abilities of political conservatives.

There were no significant differences for

moderates. The mean DIT P score for liberals was significantly lower (p < .10) under the
modified instructions than under the standard test instructions. As a result, they suggest that the
DIT systematically overstates the moral reasoning abilities of political conservatives. When the
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standard instructions were used, the mean P score for liberals is significantly higher (p<.001)
than the mean P scores for moderates and conservatives. When the modified instructions were
used, the mean P scores did not differ by political ideology (p = .920). As a result, they suggest
that instructions may be causing subjects to pursue DIT statements consistent with their preferred
political ideology, preventing the instrument from presenting a true measure of the person’s
moral competence. Given Fisher and Sweeney’s research and our concern about their basic
methodology for determining political orientation, we propose to test the same three hypotheses
that they used in their research:

H1: Accounting students with a liberal political identification will, on average,
attain higher DIT P scores than accounting students who are not liberal.

H2: Accounting students who are not politically conservative will decrease their
DIT P scores when responding from a conservative perspective.

H3: Accounting students who are not politically liberal will increase their DIT P
scores when responding from a liberal perspective.

SUBJECTS AND MEASURES
Sample
One hundred and twenty-six students enrolled in accounting classes at three schools were
initially sampled as part of this research. Of these, 28 were eliminated because they failed the
meaningless or consistency tests on the Defining Issues Test. This left a final sample of 98
students in the sample. These students took the DIT twice during a three-week period. The
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present study was motivated by concern about the validity of the DIT and methodological issues
in Fisher and Sweeney (2001, 1998) studies. They assigned subjects to the experimental groups:
“extremely conservative”, “moderate”, and “extremely liberal” on a random basis. Our research
methodology controls for political orientation by assigning students to the three treatment groups
based on their actual political orientation and P score. Furthermore, Fisher and Sweeney use a 7point Likert scale to classify political ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal) while the current
study uses a 9-point Likert scale.

Defining Issues Test
We used the shortened version (i.e., three dilemmas) of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to
measure the subjects' moral development (Rest, 1979b). Twelve considerations that reflect
reasoning at the upper five stage levels of moral development follow each dilemma
(e.g., Stage One considerations are not used in the DIT). The test directs individuals to rank the
four most important considerations for each of the three dilemmas. These four considerations
are used to measure the percent of Stage Five and Six considerations in a subject's decision
process. Test scores range from zero to 90; a score of zero (90) indicates that all ranked
considerations were in the lower four (upper two) stage levels.

Political Attitudes Survey
We also use the National Election Survey (NES, Appendix A, items a to e, Miller, 1992)
that asks subjects to indicate their opinions about social and economic issues on a seven point
Likert scale. We asked our subjects to indicate their political orientation on a modified version
of the scale used by Fisher and Sweeney (2000, 1998). Fisher and Sweeney use a seven-point
Likert scale that is unevenly apportioned to classify subjects as liberal, moderate, or conservative
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(i.e., 1-to-3 are for conservative, 4 is moderate, and 5-to-7 are for liberal).

While this is

convenient and provides an approximately equal distribution between liberals, moderates, and
conservatives, we believe it is inappropriate to assign only one data point to the moderate
classification and three each to the liberal and conservative classifications. Our study utilizes a
nine point Likert scale that is evenly apportioned when assigning subjects to categories (See
Appendix). This expanded scale provides an equal number of data points for each of the three
classifications.

RESULTS
Political Identifications and DIT P Scores (H1)
Table 2 presents the DIT scores by political orientation for the sample of 98 students.
In addition to providing the P scores, we also provide scores for stages three, four, five and six.
For comparison, we also provide the average scores for Fisher and Sweeney’s sample (1998) and
the data from Rest’s (1987) standardization sample. Hypothesis One tests whether accounting
students with a liberal political identification will, on average, have a higher average DIT P score
than accounting students who are not liberal in their political identification. It is evident that
Hypothesis One is not supported by the data in Table 2. While those students having both
moderate and conservative political identifications scored higher on the DIT, the differences
were not significant.
Insert Table 2 about here

Political Perspectives and Changes in DIT P Scores (H2 & H3)
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The data in Table 3 provide the two sets of average scores for each manipulation of
political perspectives. Hypothesis Two examines whether accounting students who are not
politically conservative will decrease their DIT P scores when responding from a conservative
perspective. The data in Table 3 indicate that, rather than decreasing, there was a slight increase
in P scores for both of the group who were not conservative and who were told to respond from a
conservative perspective. However these increases in the DIT p scores were not significant.1
Insert Table 2 about here
Hypothesis Three examines whether accounting students who are not politically liberal
will increase their DIT P scores when responding from a liberal perspective. The data in Table 3
indicate that there was a slight increase in P scores for both of the group who were not liberal
and who were told to respond from a liberal perspective. While this follows the anticipated
direction for Hypothesis Three, these increases were not significant.

Inconsistencies between Fisher and Sweeney’s and Rest’s Data
There is an interesting contrast in Table 2. Fisher and Sweeney (1998) report an
average stage five score of 20.49 with an average P score of 38.16. This means that the average
stage six score for Fisher and Sweeney’s sample was 17.67 or about 46 percent (17.67/38.16) of
their average P score. This is approximately twice as high as the average stage six score reported
by Rest for his standardization sample of 270 college graduates. Rest’s average stage six score is
only 8.16 or about 19 percent (8.16/43.19) of the average P score for his sample of college
students. Yet Rest’s average P score (43.19) is 46 percent higher than Fisher and Sweeney’s
average P score (38.16). Further, the highest stage six score is 26.7; consequently, Fisher and
Sweeney’s sample was attaining an average stage six score that was 66 percent of the maximum
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attainable. If this were true, then their sample should also have a stage five score close to the
maximum of 63.3 (90 – 26.7). However, this is not the case.

CONCLUSIONS
Our results put into question the findings of Fisher and Sweeney (1998). The data
indicate that rather than following a predictable pattern, the changes in P scores appear to be
random. While we waited three weeks prior to the second testing, it appears that the changes in
P scores may be attributable to a learning-curve effect in the sample results. Additionally, the
inconsistencies in the Fisher and Sweeney data are cause for concern. We are unable to provide
an explanation for their sample’s extremely high stage six scores (17.67 versus 8.16) compared
to their below average stage five scores (20.49 versus 35.03) when compared to Rest’s
standardization sample of college students.
Rather than affirming the validity of the DIT, our research questions the methodology
used by Fisher and Sweeney. While our results do not indicate that political orientation can
affect DIT P scores, we also believe that a single study cannot stand alone. We do not believe
that their method of dividing the sample is a valid procedure. Consequently, our study suggests
that further empirical research is necessary.
Two limitations can be identified. First, the research sample includes students from three
schools. While this sample includes one more school than Fisher and Sweeney’s sample, the
generalizeability of our findings may be restricted and may not be applicable to the entire
population of accounting students. Second, the research assumes that Rest’s Defining Issues
Test is capable of measuring moral development.
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ENDNOTE
1. We also tested to determine whether politically liberal individuals who receive instructions to
answer from an extremely liberal perspective were affected by the manipulation. While there
was a five-point difference in scores (30.43-25.43), the difference was not significant. Had
the sample size been at least 40, the five-point difference would have been significant at the
.05 level.
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TABLE 1
SIX STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Levels/Stages

Description of Primary Reasoning at Specific Stage Level

PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL -- Focus on Self
Stage 1

Obedience: You do what you are told primarily to avoid punishment.

Stage 2

Instrumental egoism and simple exchange: Let’s make a deal or only
consider the cost and/or benefits to oneself.

CONVENTIONAL LEVEL -- Focus on Relationships
Stage 3

Interpersonal concordance: Be considerate, nice, and kind, and you’ll get
along with people. The focus is on cooperation with those in your
environment.

Stage 4

Law and duty to social order: Everyone in society is obligated and
protected by the law. Focus is on cooperation with society in general.

POST CONVENTIONAL LEVELS -- Focus on Personally Held Principles
Stage 5

Societal consensus: You are obligated by whatever arrangements are
agreed to by due process procedure. Focus in on fairness of the law or
rule as determined by equity and equality in the process of developing the
rule.

Stage 6

Non-arbitrary social cooperation: How rational and impartial people
would organize cooperation is moral. Focus is on fairness of the law or
rules derived from general principles of just and right as determined by
rational people.
Adapted from Rest (1979b)
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TABLE 2
Comparison of DIT scores by self-defined political orientations
Stage 3

Stage 4

Stage 5

Stage 6

P Score

Liberals (n = 16)
Mean
Std Dev

22.71
14.71

35.82
13.57

18.59
14.81

5.99
6.76

24.58
13.94

Moderates (n = 48)
Mean
Std Dev

21.81
12.05

32.03
13.18

25.10
13.89

3.13
5.24

28.23
14.38

Conservatives (n = 34)
Mean
Std Dev

19.73
11.68

33.85
15.10

23.67
13.01

3.06
5.33

26.73
12.30

Overall (n = 98)
Mean
Std Dev

21.45
12.24

32.76
13.53

23.73
13.82

3.64
5.61

27.37
13.52

Rest's College (n = 270)
Mean

14.33

28.35

35.03

8.16

43.19

Fisher & Sweeney (1998)
Mean

7.82

21.98

20.49

17.67

38.16

Rest’s data from Guide for the Defining Issues Test (1987, 3-13)
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TABLE 3
Effects of political perspective on DIT scores
Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 P Score

Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 P Score

LIBERALS
Self-Presentation (n = 8)
Mean
25.80
33.30
Std Dev
15.57
17.30

19.96
18.00

3.79
4.55

23.75
17.14

Self-Presentation (n = 8)
Mean
19.63
38.34
Std Dev
14.13
9.00

Extremely Conservative Perspective
Mean
25.04
34.89
19.95
Std Dev
11.82
16.09
17.47

4.21
6.46

24.18
20.69

Extremely Liberal Perspective
Mean
22.10
32.14
Std Dev
12.45
10.76

17.23
11.91

8.20
8.13

25.43
10.99

20.85
8.81

9.58
5.43

30.43
10.90

25.50
12.86

Self-Presentation (n = 28)
Mean
21.73
27.28
Std Dev
12.39
11.10

28.70
13.49

2.26
5.21

30.96
14.87

26.92
17.63

Extremely Liberal Perspective
Mean
15.20
38.12
Std Dev
15.09
16.49

23.68
14.57

5.01
6.14

28.69
16.76

MODERATES
Self-Presentation (n = 20)
Mean
22.02
37.30
Std Dev
12.19
12.66

20.99
13.19

Extremely Conservative Perspective
33.67
22.90
Mean
20.48
Std Dev
15.12
13.47
14.78

4.52
5.20

4.02
5.14

CONSERVATIVES
Self-Presentation (n = 18)
Mean
18.72
33.30
Std Dev
10.57
13.35

24.43
14.28

Extremely Conservative Perspective
Mean
16.54
36.20
22.98
Std Dev
9.60
21.90
16.85

3.15
5.78

3.50
4.80

27.58
13.37

Self-Presentation (n = 16)
Mean
22.10
33.01
Std Dev
12.23
16.67

22.83
12.30

3.14
5.10

25.97
11.76

26.48
15.73

Extremely Liberal Perspective
Mean
17.81
34.98
Std Dev
17.82
19.19

20.72
14.01

6.04
4.76

26.76
16.54
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APPENDIX
Political Attitudes Survey

a.

Some people feel that the federal government in Washington should see to it that every
person has a job and good standard of living. Others think that the government should
just let each person get ahead on his/her own. And of course, other people have opinions
somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Government sees to job
and good standard of
living.
1

b.

2

Government lets each
person get ahead on
his/her own.
3

4

5

6

7

9

There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some feel that
there should be a government insurance plan that would cover all medical and hospital
expenses. Others feel that medical expenses should be paid by individuals and through
private insurance like Blue Cross. Where would you place yourself?
Government
insurance plan.
1

c.

8

Private insurance
plan.
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Some feel that the federal government in Washington should make every effort to
improve the social and economic position of African-Americans and other minority
groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help
minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?

Government should
help minority groups
1

2

Minority groups
should help
themselves
3

4

5

20

6

7

8

9

d.

There has been much discussion concerning abortion during recent years. Which of the
following opinions best agrees with your view?
1. Abortion should never be permitted.
2. Abortion should be permitted only if the life and health of the woman is in
danger.
3. Abortion should be permitted if, due to personal reasons, the woman would have
difficulty in caring for the child.
4. Abortion should never be forbidden, since one should not require a woman to
have a child she doesn’t want.

e.

There has been a lot of talk about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should
have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel
that the women’s place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale.

Women and men
should have an equal
role
1

f.

2

Women’s place is in
the home
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Concerning important political and social issues, where would you place yourself on this
scale?
Extremely
conservative

Extremely liberal
1

2

3

4

5

21

6

7

8

9

